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Abstract
Challenging the conventional wisdom that users cannot
remember cryptographically-strong secrets, we test the
hypothesis that users can learn randomly-assigned 56-
bit codes (encoded as either 6 words or 12 characters)
through spaced repetition. We asked remote research
participants to perform a distractor task that required log-
ging into a website 90 times, over up to two weeks, with
a password of their choosing. After they entered their
chosen password correctly we displayed a short code (4
letters or 2 words, 18.8 bits) that we required them to
type. For subsequent logins we added an increasing de-
lay prior to displaying the code, which participants could
avoid by typing the code from memory. As participants
learned, we added two more codes to comprise a 56.4-
bit secret. Overall, 94% of participants eventually typed
their entire secret from memory, learning it after a me-
dian of 36 logins. The learning component of our system
added a median delay of just 6.9s per login and a to-
tal of less than 12 minutes over an average of ten days.
88% were able to recall their codes exactly when asked
at least three days later, with only 21% reporting having
written their secret down. As one participant wrote with
surprise, “the words are branded into my brain.”
1 Introduction
Humans are incapable of securely storing high-quality cryp-
tographic keys ...they are also large, expensive to maintain,
difﬁcult to manage, and they pollute the environment. It is as-
tonishing that these devices continue to be manufactured and
deployed. But they are sufﬁciently pervasive that we must de-
sign our protocols around their limitations.
—Kaufman, Perlman and Speciner, 2002 [54]
The dismissal of human memory by the security com-
munity reached the point of parody long ago. While as-
signing random passwords to users was considered stan-
dard as recently in the mid-1980s [26], the practice died
out in the 90s [4] and NIST guidelines now presume all
passwords are user-chosen [32]. Most banks have even
given up on expecting customers to memorize random
four-digits PINs [22].
We hypothesized that perceived limits on humans’
ability to remember secrets are an artifact of today’s sys-
tems, which provide users with a single brief opportunity
during enrolment to permanently imprint a secret pass-
word into long-term memory. By contrast, modern theo-
ries of the brain posit that it is important to forget random
information seen once, with no connection to past expe-
rience, so as to avoid being overwhelmed by the constant
ﬂow of new sensory information [10].
We hypothesized that, if we could relax time con-
straints under which users are expected to learn, most
could memorize a randomly-assigned secret of 56 bits.
To allow for this memorization period, we propose using
an alternate form of authentication while learning, which
may be weaker or less convenient than we would like in
the long-term. For example, while learning a strong se-
cret used to protect an enterprise account, users might
be allowed to login using a user-chosen password, but
only from their assigned computer on the corporate net-
work and only for a probationary period. Or, if learning a
master key for their password manager, which maintains
a database of all personal credentials, users might only
be allowed to upload this database to the network after
learning a strong secret used to encrypt it.
By relaxing this time constraint we are able to ex-
ploit spaced repetition, in which information is learned
through exposure separated by signiﬁcant delay inter-
vals. Spaced repetition was identiﬁed in the 19th cen-
tury [43] and has been robustly shown to be among the
most effective means of memorizing unstructured infor-
mation [35, 11]. Perhaps the highest praise is its popu-
larity amongst medical students, language learners, and
others who are highly motivated to learn a large amount
of vocabulary as efﬁciently as possible [34, 91].
To test our hypothesis, we piggybacked spaced repeti-Figure 1: The login form for a user logging in for the ﬁrst
time, learning a code made of letters.
tion of a new random secret onto an existing login pro-
cess utilizing a user-chosen password. Our system can be
seen in action in Figure 1. After receiving a user’s self-
chosen password, we add a new ﬁeld into which they
must type a random security code, which we display di-
rectlyabovethisﬁeld. Witheachloginweadda 1
3 second
delay (up to a maximum of 10seconds) before display-
ing the hint for them to copy, encouraging them to type
the code from memory if possible to save time.
We recruited remote research participants to perform a
study that required logging into a website 90 times over
up to 15 days, which they did at an average rate of nine
logins per day. We assigned each participant a random
56-bit ‘security code’ encoded into three chunks of either
four lowercase letters or two words. After participants
began to enter the ﬁrst chunk before it was displayed, we
added a second and likewise for the third and ﬁnal chunk.
We did not tell participants that learning the random se-
cret was a goal of the research study; they simply learned
it to save time. Participants experienced a median addi-
tional delay from using our system of just 6.9s on each
login, or about 11m 53s total over the entire study.
Three days after participants completed the initial
study and had stopped using their security codes, we
asked them to recall their code from memory in a follow-
up survey which 88% completed. They returned after
a median of 3 days 18 hours (mean 4 days 23 hours).
We found that 46 of 56 (82%) assigned letters and 52 of
56 (93%) assigned words recalled their codes correctly.
Only 21% reported writing down or otherwise storing the
security codes outside their memory and the recall rate
was actually higher amongst those who didn’t.
While 56-bit secrets are usually overkill for web au-
thentication, the most common use of passwords to-
day, there are several compelling applications for “high
value” passwords such as master passwords for pass-
word managers, passwords used to protect private keys,
device-unlock passwords, and enterprise login pass-
words where cryptographically-strong passwords can
eliminate an entire class of attack. In debunking the
myth that users are inherently incapable of remembering
a strong secret, we advocate that using spaced repetition
to train users to remember strong secrets should be avail-
able in every security engineer’s toolbox.
2 Security goals
Evaluating the difﬁculty of guessing user-chosen pass-
words is messy [56] and security engineers are left with
few hard guarantees beyond empirical estimates of min-
entropy, which can be as low as 10 bits or fewer [18]. By
contrast, with random passwords we can easily provide
strong bounds of the difﬁculty of guessing, if not other
attack vectors against passwords [20].
2.1 The cost of brute-force
Random passwords are primarily a defense against an
ofﬂine attack (eq. brute-force attack), in which the at-
tacker is capable of trying as many guesses as they can
afford to check computationally. We can estimate the
cost of brute-force by observing the Bitcoin network [3],
which utilizes proof-of-work with SHA-256 to maintain
integrity of its transaction ledger and hence provides di-
rect monetary rewards for efﬁcient brute force. While
SHA-256 is just one example of a secure hash function,
it provides a reasonable benchmark.
In 2013, Bitcoin miners collectively performed  275
SHA-256 hashes in exchange for bitcoin rewards worth
 US$257M. This provides only a rough estimate as Bit-
coin’s price has ﬂuctuated and Bitcoin miners may have
proﬁted from carrying signiﬁcant exchange-rate risk or
utilizing stolen electricity. Still, this is the only publicly-
known operation performing in excess of 264 crypto-
graphic operations and hence provides the best estimate
available. Even assuming a centralized effort could be
an order of magnitude more efﬁcient, this still leaves us
with an estimate of US$1M to perform a 270 SHA-256
evaluations and around US$1B for 280 evaluations.
In most scenarios, we can gain equivalent security
with a smaller secret by key stretching, deliberately mak-
ing the veriﬁcation function computationally expensive
for both the attacker and legitimate users [66, 57]. Clas-
sically, this takes the form of an iterated hash func-
tion, though there are more advanced techniques such as
memory-bound hashes like scrypt [69] or halting pass-
word puzzles which run forever on incorrect guesses and
require costly backtracking [25].
Withsimpleiteratedpasswordhashing, amodernCPU
can compute a hash function like SHA-256 at around
10 MHz [1] (10 million SHA-256 computations per sec-
ond), meaning that if we slow down legitimate users by
 2ms we can add 14 bits to the effective strength of
a password, and we can add 24 bits at a cost of  2s.
While brute-forcing speed will increase as hardware im-
proves [38], the same advances enable defenders to con-
tinuously increase [72] the amount of stretching in use at
constant real-world cost [19], meaning these basic num-
bers should persist indeﬁnitely.
22.2 Practical attack scenarios
Given the above constraints, we consider a 56-bit ran-
dom password a reasonable target for most practical sce-
narios, pushing the attacker cost around US$1M with 14
bits (around 2ms) of stretching, or US$1B with 24 bits
(around 2s) of stretching. Defending against ofﬂine at-
tacks remains useful in several scenarios.
Password managers are a compelling aid to the difﬁ-
culty of remembering many passwords online, but they
reduce security for all of a user’s credentials to the
strength of a master password used to encrypt them at
rest. In at least one instance, a password management
service suffered a breach of the systems used to store
users’ data [63]. Given that password managers only
need to decrypt the credentials at startup, several seconds
of stretching may be acceptable.
Similarly, when creating a public/private key pair for
personal communication, users today typically use a
password to encrypt the private key ﬁle to guard against
theft. Given a sufﬁciently strong random password, users
could use their password and a unique public salt (e.g.,
anemailaddress)toseedarandomnumbergeneratorand
create the keys. The private key could then simply be re-
derived when needed from the password, preventing the
need for storing the private key at all. This application
also likely tolerates extensive stretching.
Passwords used to unlock personal devices (e.g.
smartphones) are becoming increasingly critical as these
devices are often a second factor (or sole factor) in au-
thentication to many other services. Today, most devices
use relatively weak secrets and rely on tamper-proof
hardware to limit the number of guesses if a device is
stolen. Strongpasswordscouldbeusedtoremovetrustin
device hardware. This is a more challenging application,
however. The budget for key-stretching may be 14 bits or
fewer, duetothefrequencywithwhichusersauthenticate
and the limited CPU and battery resources available. Ad-
ditionally, entering strong passwords quickly on a small
touchscreen may be prohibitive.
Finally, when authenticating users remotely, such as
loggingintoanenterprisenetwork, securityrequirements
may motivate transitioning from user-chosen secrets to
strong random ones. Defending against online guessing,
in which the attacker must verify password guesses us-
ing the genuine login server as an oracle, can be done
with far smaller random passwords. Even without ex-
plicit rate-limiting, attacking a 40-bit secret online would
generate signiﬁcantly more trafﬁc than any practical sys-
tem routinely handles. 40-bit random passwords would
ensure defense-in-depth against failures in rate-limiting.
Alternately, attackers may perform an ofﬂine attack
if a remote authentication server is breached. In gen-
eral, we would favor back-end defenses against pass-
word database compromises which don’t place an addi-
tional burden on users—such as hashing passwords with
a key kept in special-purpose hardware, dividing infor-
mation up amongst multiple servers [52] or one limited-
bandwidth server [41]. Random passwords would also
frustrate brute-force in this scenario, although the oppor-
tunity for key-stretching is probably closer to the 2ms
(14 bit) range to limit load on the login server.
3 Design
Given our estimation that a 56-bit secret can provide
acceptable security against feasible brute-force attacks
given a strong hash function and reasonable key stretch-
ing, our goal was to design a simple prototype interface
that could train users to learn 56 bits secret with as little
burden as possible.
Spaced repetition [43, 70, 62] typically employs de-
lays (spacings) of increasing length between rehearsals
of the chunk of information to be memorized. While pre-
ciselycontrollingrehearsalspacingmakessenseinappli-
cations where education is users’ primary goal, we did
not want to interrupt users from their work. Instead, we
chose to piggyback learning on top of an already-existing
interruption in users’ work-ﬂow—the login process it-
self. We allow users to employ a user-chosen password
for login, then piggyback learning of our assigned secret
at the end of the login step. We split the 56-bit secret up
into three equal-sized chunks to be learned sequentially,
to enable a gradual presentation and make it as easy as
possible for users to start typing from memory.
3.1 Encoding the secret
Although previous studies have found no signiﬁcant dif-
ferences in user’s ability to memorize a secret encoded
as words or letters [77, 64], we implemented both encod-
ings. For letters, we used a string of 12 lowercase letters
chosen uniformly at random from the English alphabet to
encode a 2612  56:4bit secret. The three chunks of the
secret were 4 letters each (representing 18:8bits each).
For words, we chose a sequence of 6 short, common
English words. To keep security identical to that of the
letters case, we created our own list of 676 (262) pos-
sible words such that 6 words chosen uniformly at ran-
dom would encode a 6766 = 2612  56:4 bit secret. We
extracted all 3–5 English nouns, verbs and adjectives
(which users tend to prefer in passwords [24, 85]) from
Wiktionary, excluding those marked as vulgar or slang
words and plural nouns. We also manually ﬁltered out
potentially insulting or negative words. From these can-
didate words we then greedily built our dictionary of 676
words by repeatedly choosing the most common remain-
ing word, ranked by frequency in the Google N-gram
3web corpus [27]. After choosing each word we then re-
moved all words within an edit distance of two from the
remaining set of candidates to potentially allow limited
typo correction. We also excluded words which were a
complete preﬁx of any other word, to potentially allow
auto-complete. We present the complete list in Table 3.
3.2 Login form and hinting
Unlike typical login forms, we do not present a button
to complete sign-in, but rather automatically submit the
password for veriﬁcation via AJAX each time a character
is typed. Above the password ﬁeld we display the word
“verifying” while awaiting a response and “not yet cor-
rect” while the current text is not the correct password.
After the user’s self-chosen password is veriﬁed, a text
box for entering the ﬁrst chunk of the user’s assigned
code appears to the right of the password ﬁeld, as we
show in Figure 1. On the ﬁrst login, we display the
correct value of the chunk immediately above the ﬁeld
into which users must enter it. In the version used for
our study, we included a pop-up introducing the security
code and its purpose:
Due to concerns about stolen accounts and bonuses, we are giv-
ing you an additional security code. To ﬁnish logging in, simply
type the [four letters j two words] above the text box. Your code
will not change, so once you have learned it, try to type it before
the hint appears.
We color each character a user enters into the security
code ﬁeld green if it is correct and red if incorrect. We re-
place correct characters with a green circle after 250ms.
With each consecutive login, we delay the appearance
of the hint by 1
3 of a second for each time the user has
previously seen the chunk, up to a maximum of 10 sec-
onds. If the user types a character correctly before the
delay expires, we start the delay countdown again. We
selected these delay values with the goal of imposing the
minimal annoyance necessary to nudge users to start typ-
ing from memory.
After a user enters a chunk without seeing the hint on
three consecutive logins, we add another chunk. In the
version used in our study, we show a pop-up which can
be dismissed for all future logins:
Congratulations! You have learned the ﬁrst [four letters j two
words] of your security code. We have added another [four let-
ters j two words]. Just like the ﬁrst [four letters j two words],
once you have learned them, you can type them without waiting
for the hint to appear.
When we detect that a user has ﬁnished typing the
ﬁrst chunk of their security code, we automatically tab
(moved the cursor) to the text ﬁeld for the second chunk
and then start the delay for that chunk’s hint. After typ-
ing the second chunk correctly from memory three times
Figure 2: The login form for a user in who has just re-
ceived the third security code chunk words.
in a row, we add the third and ﬁnal chunk. In the version
used in the study, we also displayed one more pop-up:
Congratulations! You have learned the ﬁrst [eight letters j four
words] of your security code. We have added a ﬁnal [four letters
j two words]. These are the last [four letters j two words] we
will ask you to learn. Once you have learned them, you can type
them before the hint appears. Once you know the full code, we
can use it to protect your account.
We illustrate the login process from our study, using
all three chunks, in Figure 2. In a real deployment, once
the user is consistently typing the entire security code
frommemory, enteringtheirself-chosenpasswordwould
no longer be necessary.
We disable pasting and automatic form-ﬁlling for the
security code ﬁeld to encourage users to type from mem-
ory. We allow users to type their code in lower or upper
case, with all non-letter characters being ignored, includ-
ing spaces between words as no word is a preﬁx of any
other word. During training we automatically insert a
space at the end of any entered code word so users learn
that they do not need to type the spaces.
4 Experimental Methodology
We used a remote online study to evaluate our system.
To keep participants from realizing the purpose of our
study wasthe security codesand potentially alteringtheir
behavior, we presented our study as a psychology study
with the security codes a routine part of logging in to
participate. We recruited participants using Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) platform [59] and paid them
to participate, which required logging in 90 times in 15
days. For completeness, we provide exact study materi-
als the extended version of this paper [23].
4.1 The distractor task
We intended our distractor task to provide a plausible
object of study that would lead us to ask participants to
log in to our website repeatedly (distracting participants
from the subject of our investigation) and to require a
non-trivial mental effort (distracting them from making
conscious efforts to memorize their security codes). Yet
we also wanted the distractor task to be relatively fast,
4Figure 3: The Attention Game, our distractor task
interesting, and challenging, since we were asking par-
ticipants to perform a large number of logins.
We designed a game to resemble descendants of the
classic psychological study that revealed the Stroop ef-
fect [79]. Our game measured participants’ ability to ig-
nore where a word appeared (the left or right side of their
screen) and respond to the meaning of the word itself.
Each 60-second game consisted of 10 trials during which
either the word ‘left’ or ‘right’ would appear in one of
two squares on the screen, as illustrated in Figure 3. The
words appeared in a random square after a random delay
of 2–4 seconds, after which participants were asked to
immediately press the f key upon seeing the word ‘left’
or j key upon seeing the word ‘right’ (corresponding to
the left and right sides of a QWERTY keyboard). During
the game, participants saw a score based on their reaction
time, with penalties for pressing the wrong key.
4.2 Treatments
We randomly assigned participants to three treatments:
letters (40% of participants), words (40%), and control
(20%). Participants in the letters and words treatments
received security codes consisting of letters and words,
respectively, as described in Section 3.1. Participants
in the control treatment received no security code at all
and saw a simple password form for all logins; we in-
cluded this treatment primarily to gauge whether the ad-
ditional security codes were causing participants to drop
out of the experiment more than traditional authentica-
tion would have.
4.3 Recruiting
We recruited participants to our study using Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk by posting a Human Intelligence
Task (HIT) titled “60-Second Attention Study”, paying
US$0.40, and requiring no login. When participants
completed the game, we presented them with an offer
to “Earn $19 by being part of our extended study” (a
screenshot of the offer is in the extended version of this
paper [23]). The offer stated that participants would be
required to play the game again 90 times within 15 days,
answertwoshortquestionsbeforeplayingthegame, wait
30 minutes after each game before starting a new game
session, and that they would have to login for each ses-
sion. We warned participants that those who joined the
extended study but did not complete it would not receive
partial payment. Our study prominently listed Microsoft
Research as the institution responsible for the study. As
we did not want to place an undue burden on workers
who were not interested in even reading our offer, we
provided a link with a large boldface heading titled “Get
paid now for your participation in this short experiment”
allowing participants to be paid immediately without ac-
cepting, or even reading, our offer.
When workers who had performed the single-game
HIT signed up to participate in our 90-game attention
study, we presented them with a sign-up page displaying
our approved consent form and asking them to choose a
username and a password of at least six characters. For
the 88 logins following signup (games 2–89), and for lo-
gin to the ﬁnal session (in which we did not show the
game but instead showed the ﬁnal survey), we required
participants to login using the chosen password and se-
curity code (if assigned a non-control treatment).
Amazon’s policies forbid HITs that require workers to
sign up for accounts on websites or to provide their email
addresses. These rules prevent a number of abusive uses
of Mechanical Turk. They also protect Amazon’s busi-
ness by forbidding requesters from recruiting workers,
establishing a means of contact that bypasses Amazon,
and then paying hired workers for future tasks without
paying Amazon for its role in recruiting the workers. Our
HIT was compliant with the letter of these rules because
we only required workers to play the attention game, and
they were in no way obligated to sign up for the full at-
tention study. We were also compliant with the spirit of
the rules, as we were not asking workers to engage in
abusive actions and we did not cut Amazon out of their
role as market maker—we paid participants for the 90-
game attention study by posting a bonus for the HIT they
already completed through Amazon.
As in any two-week project, some participants re-
quested extensions to the completion deadline in order to
reach 90 completed game. We provided 24-hour exten-
sions to participants who were within 20 games of com-
pleting the study at the deadline.
5Figure 4: Participants were asked to ﬁll out this two-
question survey before every attention game.
Figure 5: After completing an attention test, participants
could not perform another one for 30 minutes.
4.4 Sessions
After each login we presented a very short survey (shown
in Figure 4) asking participants about their recent sleep
and eating. This was designed solely to support the pur-
ported goal of the study and we ignored the responses.
After participants completed the survey we immedi-
ately displayed the “Attention Game”. When they com-
pleted the game, we overlaid a timer on top of the page
counting down 30 minutes until they could again ﬁll out
the survey and play the game (see Figure 5). The timer
also counted down in the title of the page, so that partic-
ipants would see the countdown when browsing in other
tabs and know when they were next allowed to play. If
participants tried to log into the website again before the
30-minute waiting period was complete, we displayed
the countdown again, starting from the amount of time
remaining since they last completed the game.
4.5 Completion survey
When participants logged in for the 90th and ﬁnal time,
we skipped the game and displayed our completion sur-
vey. We provide the full text of the survey (with partici-
pants’ answer counts) in the extended version of this pa-
per [23]. We started the survey with demographic ques-
tionsandthenaskedparticipantsiftheyhadwrittendown
or stored their passwords or assigned security codes out-
side of their memory.
We then debriefed participants about the true nature of
the study, explaining that the security code was the focus
of the study, though we did not reveal that we planned
a follow-up study. We could not defer the debrieﬁng to
the follow-up study, as participants had not committed to
engage with us beyond the end of the study and might
not accept invitations for future contact. Indeed, some
participants reported discussing the study in forums, but
as we had entrusted those who ﬁnished the study with the
truth, they returned that trust by respecting forum rules
against ‘spoilers’ in all cases we are aware of.
To aid with the follow-up study, we asked participants
to provide their email address, stating the question in a
manner that we hoped would minimize suspicion that a
formal follow-up study was imminent.
If our analysis raises more questions about your experi-
ence during the study, may we contact you and ask you to
answer a few questions in return for an additional bonus?
If so, provide your email below. (This is optional!)
4.6 Payment
We paid $20 to participants who completed the study, as
opposed to the $19 promised, to show extra gratitude for
their participation. We informed participants of this only
after they had completed the ‘attention’ study and ﬁlled
out their post-deception ethics questionnaire, so as to not
taint their responses about the ethics of the deception.
However, this payment came well before the invitation
to the follow-up study. Receiving a payment exceeding
what we had promised may have increased participants’
receptiveness to that invitation.
Despite telling participants they would not be paid un-
less they completed the study, we did pay $0.20 per lo-
gin to all participants who logged into the site at least
once after signing up. We did so because we couldn’t
be certain that the extra work of entering a security code
didn’t cause some participants to drop out. We wanted
to ensure that if participants found the security code so
arduous as to quit, they would not lose out on payment
for the attention tests they did complete. We did not re-
veal this fact to the participants who completed the study
and ﬁlled out the ethics survey as we feared they might
communicate it to those who had yet to ﬁnish.
4.7 Follow-ups
At least 72 hours after a non-control group participant
completed the study, we emailed them an invitation to
perform an additional HIT for $1 (this email is repro-
duced in the extended version of this paper [23]). Most
6participants provided an email address in the ﬁnal sur-
vey of the attention study; we tried to contact those who
didn’t via Mechanical Turk. When participants accepted
the HIT, we identiﬁed them by their Mechanical Turk ID
to verify that they’d participated in the main study.1
The follow-up study contained only one question:
Please try to recall and enter the security code that we as-
signed you during the attention study.
If you stored or wrote down your security code, please
do not look it up. We are only interested in knowing what
you can recall using only your memory. It’s OK if you
don’t remember some or all of it. Just do the best you can.
We presented participants with three text ﬁelds for the
three chunks of their security code. Unlike the data-entry
ﬁeld used when they logged in for the attention experi-
ment, weusedplaintextﬁeldswithoutanyguidanceasto
whether the characters typed were correct. We accepted
all responses from participants that arrived within two
weeks of their completion of the study.
We emailed all participants who completed the ﬁrst
follow-up again 14 days after they completed it with the
offer to complete a second identical follow-up for an ad-
ditional $1 reward.
4.8 Ethics
The experiment was performed by Microsoft Research
and was reviewed and approved by the organization’s
ethics review process prior to the start of our ﬁrst pilot.2
We employed deception to mask the focus of our re-
search out of concern that participants might work harder
to memorize a code if they knew it to be the focus of our
study. We took a number of steps to minimize the poten-
tial for our deception to cause harm. We provided partic-
ipants with estimates for the amount of time to complete
the study padded to include the unanticipated time to en-
ter the security code. While we told participants they
would not be paid if they did not complete the study, we
did make partial payments. We monitored how partic-
ipants responded to the deception, investigating the re-
sponses of pilot participants before proceeding with the
full study and continued to monitor participants in the
full study, using a standard post-deception survey hosted
by the Ethical Research Project [82]. We also offered
participants the opportunity to withdraw their consent for
use data derived from their participants. The vast major-
ity of participants had no objection to the deception and
1We failed to verify that it had been three days since they completed
the study, requiring us to disqualify three participants who discovered
the follow-up study prematurely (see Section 5.1).
2The ﬁrst author started a position at Princeton after the research
was underway. He was not involved in the execution of the study or
communications with participants. He did not have access to the email
addresses of those participants who volunteered to provide them (the
only personally-identiﬁable information collected).
none asked to have their data withdrawn. We provide
more detail on participants’ ethics responses in the ex-
tended version of this paper [23].
5 Results
We present overall analysis of the most important results
from our study: participant’s ability to learn and recall
security codes. We present a full accounting of partici-
pants’ responses to the multiple-choice questions of our
ﬁnalsurveyandthecompletetextofthatsurveyintheex-
tended version of this paper [23], including demograph-
ics which reﬂect the typical MTurk population [74].
5.1 Recruitment and completion
We offered our initial attention-game task to roughly 300
workers from February 3–5, 2014. 251 workers accepted
the offer to participate in our study by completing the
sign-up page and playing the ﬁrst game. We stopped
inviting new participants when we had reached roughly
100 sign-ups for our two experimental groups. Partic-
ipants’ assigned treatment had no effect until they re-
turned after sign-up and correctly entered their username
and chosen password into the login page, so we discard
the 28 who signed up but never returned. We categorize
the 223 participants who did return in Table 1.
5.1.1 Dropouts
Inserting a security-code learning step into the login pro-
cess creates an added burden for participants. Of par-
ticipants who completed the study, typing (and waiting
for) the security codes added a median delay of 6.9s per
login. To measure the impact of this burden, we tested
the hypothesis that participants assigned a security code
would be less likely to complete the experiment than
those in the control. The null hypothesis is that group
assignment has no impact on the rate of completion.
Indeed, the study-completion rates in the fourth row
of Table 1 are higher for control than the experimental
groups. We use a two-tailed Fisher’s Exact Test to com-
pare the proportion of participants who completed the
study between those assigned a security code (the union
of the letters and words treatments, or 133 of 170) to that
of the control (35 of 41). The probability of this dif-
ference occurring by chance under the null hypothesis is
p = 0:2166. While this is far from the threshold for sta-
tistical signiﬁcance, such a test cannot be used to reject
the alternate hypothesis that the observed difference re-
ﬂects a real percentage of participants who dropped out
due to the security code.
Digging into the data further, we can separate out
those participants who abandoned the study after exactly
7Control Letters Words Total
Signed up for the ‘attention’ study 41 92 90 223
Quit after 2 or 3 games 0/41 0% 9/92 10% 12/90 13% 21/223 9%
Otherwise failed to ﬁnish 6/41 15% 14/92 15% 12/90 13% 32/223 14%
Completed the ‘attention’ study 35/41 85% 69/92 75% 66/90 73% 170/223 76%
Received full security code — 63/68 93% 64/65 98% 127/133 95%
Typed entire code from memory — 62/63 99% 64/64 100% 126/127 99%
Participated in ﬁrst follow-up — 56/63 89% 56/64 88% 112/127 88%
Recalled code correctly — 46/56 82% 52/56 93% 98/112 88%
Participated in second follow-up — 52/56 93% 52/56 93% 104/112 93%
Recalled code correctly — 29/52 56% 32/52 62% 61/104 59%
Table 1: Results summary: participants who signed up for the attention study, the fraction of those participants who
completed the study, the fraction of the remaining participants who entered the ﬁrst two chunks of their security code
reliably enough to be shown the full security code (all three chunks), the fraction of those remaining who participated
in the follow-up studies (after 3 and 17 days, respectively), and the fraction of those who recalled their security code
correctly. The control group did not receive security codes and hence are excluded from the latter rows of the table.
two or three games from those who failed to ﬁnish later
(noparticipantquitafterthefourthorﬁfthgames). While
no participant in the control quit between two or three
games, 9 participants assigned to letters and 12 assigned
to words did. For participants who completed more than
three games, the rate of failure to ﬁnish the study is re-
markably consistent between groups. We do not perform
statistical tests as this threshold is data-derived and any
hypothesis based on it would be post-hoc. Rather, as our
study otherwise presents a overall favorable view of ran-
dom assigned secrets, we present the data in this way as
it illustrates to the reader reason for skepticism regarding
user acceptance among unmotivated participants.
5.1.2 Participants who appeared not to learn
Six participants completed the study without receiving
all three chunks of their security codes, having failed to
demonstrate learning by typing the ﬁrst chunk (one par-
ticipant from letters) or second chunk (ﬁve participants,
four from letters and one from words) before the hint ap-
peared. After the conclusion of the study we offered par-
ticipants $1 to provide insights into what had happened
and all replied. Two in the letters group, including the
one who only received one chunk, reported genuine difﬁ-
culty with memory. The other four stated quite explicitly
(which we provide in the extended version of this pa-
per [23]) that they purposely avoided revealing that they
had learned the second chunk to avoid being assigned
more to learn.
5.1.3 Excluded participants
We found it necessary to exclude four participants from
some of our analysis. Three participants, two in words
and one in letters, discovered and accepted the follow-
up HIT before three days had passed since the end of
the study, ignoring the admonition not to accept this HIT
without an invitation. Though these participants all com-
pleted the 90-game attention study, learned and recalled
their entire security code, we count them as having not
returned for the follow-up. We corrected this bug prior
to the second follow-up. We disqualiﬁed one additional
‘participant’ in the letters group which appeared to be
using an automated script.
After revealing the deceptive nature of the study we
gave participants the option to withdraw their consent for
us to use our observations of their behavior, while still
receiving full payment. Fortunately, none chose to do so.
5.2 Learning rates
Of non-control participants completing the study, 93%
eventually learned their full security code well enough
to type it from memory three times in a row (91% of
letters and 96% of words). Most participants learned
their security codes early in the study, after a median of
36 logins (37 for letters and 33 of words). We show the
cumulative distribution of when participants memorized
each chunk of their code in Figure 6.
We consider whether participants ﬁrst typed their
codes from memory in fewer logins with either letters
or words, with the null hypothesis that encoding had no
impact on this measure of learning speed. A two-tailed
Mann-Whitney U (rank sum) test on the distribution of
these two sets of learning speeds estimates a probability
of p = 0:07 (U = 1616) of observing this difference by
chance, preventing us from rejecting the null hypothesis.
We had hypothesized that, with each subsequent
chunk we asked participants to memorize, their learn-
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Figure 6: We show the proportion of participants who
had memorized each chunk of their security code after
a given number of login attempts. We considered a par-
ticipant to have memorized a chunk after they entered it
without a hint in three consecutive logins.
ing speed might decrease due to interference [31] or in-
crease due to familiarity with the system. Learning times
decreased. We use a Mann-Whitney U test to compare
learning times between the ﬁrst and ﬁnal chunks, using
times only for participants who learned all three, yielding
a signiﬁcant p < 0:001 (U = 4717). To remove the im-
pact of the time required to notice the delay and learn that
they could enter the code before it appeared, we compare
the learning times between the third and second chunks.
This difference is much smaller, with a Mann-Whitney
U test yielding a probability of p = 0:39 (U = 7646) of
an effect due to chance.
To illustrate the increasing rate of learning we show,
in Figure 7, the percent of participants who typed each
chunk correctly from memory as a function of the num-
ber of previous exposures to that chunk.
5.3 Login speed and errors
Overall, participants in the words group took a median
time of 7.7s to enter their security codes, including wait-
ing for any hints to appear that they needed, and partic-
ipants in the letters group took a median time of 6.0s.
Restricting our analysis to those logins in which partici-
pants were required to enter all three chunks of the code
only increases the median login time to 8.2s for words
and 6.1s for letters.3 The distribution had a relatively
long tail, however, with the 95th percentile of logins tak-
ing 23.6s for words and 20.5s for letters.
3The median login time actually went down for letters participants
when all three chunks were required, likely because this included more
logins typed exclusively from memory with no waiting for a hint.
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Figure 7: For each of the three chunks in participants’ se-
curity codes, we show the proportion of participants who
entered each chunk without a hint as a function of the
number of previous exposures to the chunk (the number
of previous logins in which the chunk appeared). On the
whole, participants actually memorized their second and
third chunks more quickly than the ﬁrst.
After computing the median login time for each par-
ticipant, we compared the set of these values for par-
ticipants in the two experimental groups using a Mann-
WhitneyU. Wecanrejectthenullhypothesisthatthedif-
ferencesbetweenthesemediansweretheresultofchance
with p < 0:01 (U = 1452) and conclude that participants
in the letters group were signiﬁcantly faster.
Errors in entering security codes (whether typos or
genuine memory errors) were relatively rare: over all 90
logins participants in the words group made fewer errors
(with a median of 5) than participants in the letters group
(median 7). Using a Mann-Whitney U, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis that neither group would make more
errors than the other (p = 0:08 (U = 1706)).
5.4 Recall of security codes in follow-ups
We sent invitations to participants to follow-up studies
testing recall of their security codes 3 days after the ini-
tial study ended and then 14 more days after they com-
pleted the ﬁrst follow-up. The median time between
when participants completed the study and actually took
the ﬁrst follow-up study was 3 days 18 hours (mean 4
days 23 hours). For the second follow-up study the me-
dian time was 16 days 0 hours (mean 16 days 13 hours).
By comparison, the median time to complete the study
itself was 10 days 5 hours (mean 9 days 19 hours).
Overall, 88% of participants recalled their code cor-
rectly in the ﬁrst follow-up and 59% did so in the sec-
ond. The drop-off at the second follow-up was expected
9as memory is believed to decay exponentially with the
delay since the information was last recalled [89].
We had hypothesized that participants in the letters
treatmentmightbemoreorlesslikelytorecalltheirsecu-
rity codes correctly in the follow-ups than participants in
the words treatment. As seen in Table 1, of participants
in the letters group 82% recalled their security codes cor-
rectly in the ﬁrst follow-up and 56% did so in the second
study, compared to 93% and 62%, respectively, of users
in words. Using a two-tailed Fisher’s Exact Test, we can-
not rule out the null hypothesis that participants in ei-
ther group were equally likely to recall codes correctly,
with the observed differences occurring with a p = 0:15
chance in the ﬁrst follow-up and p = 0:45 in the second
follow-up under the null hypothesis.
5.4.1 Types of errors
We observed 14 participants incorrectly entering their
code in the ﬁrst follow-up and 52 in the second. All
13 users who entered incorrectly in the ﬁrst follow-up
and participated in the second entered their code incor-
rectly again. This sample is too low to draw ﬁrm con-
clusions about the nature of participants’ recall errors,
but we did see evidence that users retained partial mem-
ory, with 75% of users entering at least one component
of their code correctly in the second follow-up and 48%
missing only one component or entering components in
the wrong order. Re-arranging the order of components,
which accounted for 10% of errors, could be corrected
by accepting components in any order at a loss of only
log2(3!)  2:6bits of security. Unfortunately, the major-
ity of other errors could not be corrected without signif-
icantly downgrading security. Only 3 participants (6%)
in the second-followup (and 2 in the ﬁrst) entered a code
within an edit distance of 2 of the correct code. We
present further information on the types of errors ob-
served in the extended version of this paper [23].
5.4.2 Storing security codes
A minority of participants reported storing their security
code outside of their memory, as presented in Table 2.
We were concerned that participants who had stored their
security codes might have been tempted to look them up
and thereby inﬂated the recall rate during the follow-up.
However, only 82% of participants storing their security
code recalled it correctly on follow-up, whereas 89% of
participants not storing the security code did. While it’s
possible that participants who did not rely on a stored
code were better able to remember as a result, we had not
hypothesized this in advance nor would the differences
we observed have been statistically signiﬁcant.
We had hypothesized that participants might be more
likely to write down or otherwise store codes outside
their memory if assigned a code composed of letters as
opposed to words, or vice versa. The null hypothesis is
that treatment has no impact on the choice to store codes.
In the completion survey, 18 of the 69 participants in
the letters treatment reported having stored their security
code, as compared to 10 of the 66 in the words treatment.
We use a two-sided Fisher’s Exact Test to estimate that
such a difference would occur with probability p = 0:14
under the null hypothesis. Thus we can not conclude that
either treatment made participants more likely to write
their code down.
6 Limitations
Whenever testing a new approach to security, its novelty
alone may be enough to reveal to research participants
that it is the focus of the study. Despite our best efforts,
of the 133 participants in the experimental groups who
completed the study (68 in letters and 65 in words), only
35 (26%, 24 from letters and 11 from words) reported
that they did not suspect that the security code might be
the focus of the study. The majority, 70 (53%, 28 from
letters and 42 from words) reported having some suspi-
cion and 28 (21%, 16 from letters and 12 from words)
reported being ‘certain’ the security code was the focus
of the study. Still, to our knowledge no participants re-
vealed any ‘spoilers’ on public forums. Participants who
suspected we were studying their ability to learn the se-
curity code may have tried harder to memorize the code
than if they had not, though it’s not clear how their effort
would compare to that of a real-world user relying on a
randomly-assigned code to secure something valuable.
7 Background and related work
7.1 Physiological principles of memory
Human memory has been studied extensively by psy-
chologists (as well as neuroscientists and others). The
spacing effect describes how people are better able to re-
call information if it is presented for the same duration,
but in intervals spaced over a longer period of time. This
effect was ﬁrst described in the 19th century [43] and is
considered one of the most robust memory effects [10].
It has even been demonstrated in animals. The effect is
almost always far more powerful than variations in mem-
ory between individual people [35].
The cause of the spacing effect is still under debate,
but most theories are based around the multi-store model
of memory [33] in which short-term (or working mem-
ory)andlong-termmemoryaredistinctneurologicalpro-
cesses [8, 9]. One theory of the spacing effect posits
10Did you store any part of the additional security code for the
study website, such as by writing it down, emailing it to
yourself, or adding it to a password manager?
‘Yes’ ‘No’
Letters Words Letters Words
Completed the study 18/68 26% 10/65 15% 50/68 74% 55/65 85%
Reported storing password 11/18 61% 6/10 60% 2/50 4% 0/55 0%
Received full security code 16/18 89% 9/10 90% 47/50 94% 55/55 100%
Participated in follow-up 14/16 88% 8/9 89% 42/47 89% 48/55 87%
Recalled code correctly 12/14 86% 6/8 75% 34/42 81% 46/48 96%
Table 2: A minority of participants reported storing their security code outside of their memory. Each row corresponds
toanidentically-namedrowinTable1, separatedbyparticipants’responsetothecodestoragequestionineachcolumn.
The ﬁrst row shows the fraction of all participants who completed the study in each group, and each subsequent row
as a fraction of the one above, except for the italicized row which identiﬁes participants who reported storing their
self-chosen password (which was much more common amongst participants who stored their security code).
that when information is presented which has left short-
term memory, a trace of it is recognized from long-term
memory [47] and hence stimulated, strengthening the
long-term memory through long-term potentiation [14]
of neural synapses. Thus, massed presentation of in-
formation is less effective at forming long-term memo-
ries because the information is recognized from work-
ing memory as it is presented. In our case, the natural
spacingbetweenpasswordloginsisalmostcertainlylong
enough for the password to have left working memory.
Early work on spaced learning focused on expanding
presentation in which an exponentially increasing inter-
val between presentations was considered optimal [70,
62]. More recent reviews have suggested that the pre-
cise spacing between presentations is not particularly im-
portant [11] or that even spacing may actually be supe-
rior [53]. This is fortunate for our purposes as password
logins are likely to be relatively evenly spaced in time.
Other work has focused on dynamically changing spac-
ing using feedback from the learner such as speed and
accuracy of recall [68] which could potentially guide ar-
tiﬁcial rehearsal of passwords.
7.2 Approaches to random passwords
Many proposals have aimed to produce random pass-
words which are easier for humans to memorize, im-
plicitly invoking several principles of human memory.
Early proposals typically focused on pronounceable ran-
dom passwords [46, 90] in which strings were produced
randomly but with an English-like distribution of letters
or phonemes. This was the basis for NIST’s APG stan-
dard [2], though that speciﬁc scheme was later shown to
be weak [45]. The independently-designed pwgen com-
mand for generating pronounceable passwords is still
distributed with many Unix systems [5].
Generatingarandom setofwords fromadictionary, as
we did in our words treatment, is also a classic approach,
now immortalized by the web comic XKCD [67]. This
was ﬁrst proposed by Kurzban [61] with a very small 100
word dictionary, the popular Diceware project [6] offers
4,000 word dictionaries. Little available research exists
on what size and composition of dictionaries is optimal.
Finally, a number of proposals have aimed to enhance
memorability of a random string by offering a secondary
coding such as a set of images [58], a grammatical sen-
tence [7, 50], or a song [65]. Brown’s passmaze proto-
col was recognition-based, with users simply recogniz-
ing words in a grid [29]. None of these proposals has
received extensive published usability studies.
7.3 Studies on password recall
A number of studies have examined user performance
in recalling passwords under various conditions. These
studies often involve users choosing or being assigned a
new password in an explicitly experimental setting, and
testing the percentage of users who can correctly recall
their password later. Surprisingly, a large number of
studies have failed to ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant im-
pact on users’ ability to recall passwords chosen under
a variety of experimental treatments, including varying
length and composition requirements [95, 71, 92, 86, 60]
or requiring sentence-length passphrases [55].4 The con-
sistent lack of impact of password structure on recall
rates across studies appears to have gone unremarked in
any of the individual studies.
However, several studies have found that stricter com-
position requirements increase the number of users writ-
ing their passwords down [71, 60] and users self-report
that they believe passwords are harder to remember when
created under stricter password policies [60, 92].
4Keith et al. [55] did observe far more typos with sentence-length
passwords, which needed correcting to isolate the effective recall rates.
11At least three studies have concluded that users are
more likely to remember passwords they use with greater
frequency [95, 28, 42]. This suggests that lack of ad-
equate training may in fact be the main bottleneck to
password memorization, rather than the inherent com-
plexity of passwords themselves. Brostoff [28] appears
to have made the only study of password automacity (the
ability to enter a password without consciously thinking
about it), and estimated that for most users, this property
emerges for passwords they type at least once per day.
A few studies have directly compared recall rates of
user-generated passwords to assigned passwords. Inter-
estingly, none has been able to conclude that users were
less likely to remember assigned passwords. For exam-
ple, in a 1990 study by Zviran and Haga [94] in which
users were asked to generate a password and then recall it
3 months later, recall was below 50% for all unprompted
textpasswordsandnoworseforsystem-assignedrandom
passwords, though the rate of writing increased. A simi-
lar lab study by Bunnell et al. found a negligibly smaller
difference in recall rate for random passwords [30]. A
2000 study by Yan et al. [92] found that users assigned
random passwords for real, frequently-used accounts ac-
tually requested fewer password resets than users choos-
ing their own passwords, though those users were also
encouragedtowritetheirpasswordsdown“untiltheyhad
memorized them.” Stobert in 2011 [78] found no sig-
niﬁcant difference in recall between assigned and user-
chosen text passwords.
Two studies have exclusively compared user’s ability
to recall random passwords under different encodings.
The results of both were inconclusive, with no signiﬁ-
cant difference in recall rate between users given random
alphanumeric strings, random pronounceable strings or
randomly generated passphrases at a comparable secu-
rity level of 30 [77] or 38 bits [64]. The results ap-
pear robust to signiﬁcant changes in the word dictionary
used for passwords or the letters used in random strings.
However, users stated that alphanumeric strings seemed
harder to memorize than random passphrases [77].
All of these studies except that of Yan et al. face va-
lidity concerns as the passwords were explicitly created
for a study of password security. A 2013 study by Fahl
et al. [44] compared user behavior in such scenarios and
foundthatanon-trivialproportionofusersbehavesignif-
icantly differently in explicit password studies by choos-
ingdeliberatelyweakpasswords, whilealargenumberof
users re-use real passwords in laboratory studies. Both
behaviors bias text passwords to appear more memo-
rable, as deliberately weak passwords may be easy to
memorize and existing passwords may already be mem-
orized. Also of concern, all of these studies (again ex-
cluding Yan et al.) involved a single enrollment process
followed by recall test, with no opportunity for learning.
Spaced repetition for passwords was recently sug-
gested by Blocki et al. [16], who proposed designing
password schemes which insert a minimal number of ar-
tiﬁcial rehearsals to maintain security. After our study,
Blocki published results from a preliminary study on
mnemonic passwords with formal rehearsals [15]. Com-
pared to our study, participants performed a much lower
number of rehearsals spaced (about 10) spaced over a
longer period (up to 64 days), prompted by the system
at speciﬁc times rather than at the participant’s conve-
nience. Unlike our study participants were aware that
memorization was the explicit goal of the study. Blocki
also incorporated additional mnemonic techniques (im-
ages and stories). This study provides evidence that
spaced repetition and other techniques can be applied
more aggressively for motivated users, whereas as our
study demonstrates the practicality with few system
changes and unmotivated users.
7.4 Alternative authentication schemes
Several approaches have been explored for exploiting
properties of human memory in authentication systems.
One approach is to query already-held memories us-
ing personal knowledge question schemes such as “what
is your mother’s maiden name?” though more sophis-
ticated schemes have been proposed [93, 48] While
these schemes typically enable better recall than pass-
words, they are vulnerable to attacks by close social re-
lations [76], many people’s answers are available in on-
line search engines or social networks [73], and many
questions are vulnerable to statistical guessing [21, 76].
An advantage of personal knowledge questions is that
they represent cued recall with the question acting as
a cue, which generally increases memory performance
over free recall.
Graphical passwords aim to utilize humans’ strong
abilities to recognize visual data [13]. Some schemes
employ cued recall only by asking users to recognize a
secret image from a set [40, 87, 80]. Others use uncued
memory by asking users to draw a secret pattern [49, 81,
12] or click a set of secret points in an image [88, 37].
These schemes are often still vulnerable to guessing at-
tacks due to predictable user choices [39, 83, 84]. The
Persuasive Cued Click-Points scheme [36] attempts to
address this by forcing users to choose points within a
system-assigned region, which was not found to signif-
icantly reduce recall. Still, it remains unclear exactly
what level of security is provided by most graphical
schemes and they generally take longer to authentication
than typing a text password. They have found an im-
portant niche on mobile devices with touch screens, with
current versions of Android and Windows 8 deploying
graphical schemes for screen unlock.
12Bojinov et al. [17] proposed the use of implicit mem-
ory for authentication, training users to type a random
key sequence in rapid order using a game similar to one
used in psychological research to study implicit mem-
ory formation [75]. After a 30–45 minute training pe-
riod, users were tested 1–2 weeks later on the same game
with their trained sequences and random sequences, with
about half performing signiﬁcantly better on trained se-
quences. Such a scheme offers the unique property that
users are unaware of their secret and thus incapable of
leaking it to an attacker who doesn’t know the correct
secret challenge to test on, providing a measure of re-
sistance against “rubber-hose” attacks (physical torture).
Without dramatic improvements however this scheme is
impractical for normal personal or corporate logins due
to the very long enrollment and login times and the low
rate of successful authentication.
8 Open questions and future work
As this was our ﬁrst exploration of spaced repetition for
learning random secrets, many of our design choices
were best guesses worthy of further exploration. The
character set used when encoding secrets as letters,
namely 26 lowercase letters, might be inferior to an ex-
panded set such as base-32 with digits included [51]. Our
choice of a dictionary of 676 words is almost surely not
optimal, since we deliberately chose it for equivalence to
thesizeofourcharacterset. Splittingthesecretintothree
equal-sized chunks was also simply a design heuristic,
performance might be better with more or fewer chunks.
We expect spaced repetition to be a powerful enough
tool for users to memorize secrets under a variety rep-
resentation formats, though the precise details may have
importantimplications. Weobservedletterstobeslightly
faster to type and words slightly faster to learn. We also
observed double the rate of forgotten codes after three
days in the letters group and, though this difference was
not statistically signiﬁcant given our sample sizes and the
low absolute difference, this is worthy of further study as
this difference could be important in practice.
Our system can likely be improved by exploiting ad-
ditional memory effects, such as dual-coding secrets by
showing pictures next to each word or requiring greater
depth of processing during each rehearsal. Cued recall
could also be utilized by showing users random prompts
(images or text) in addition to a random password.
On the downside, interference effects may be a ma-
jor hindrance if users were asked to memorize multiple
random passwords using a system like ours. This is wor-
thy of further study, but suggests that random passwords
should only be used for critical accounts.
Changing the login frequency may decrease or in-
crease performance. We aimed to approximate the num-
ber of daily logins required in an enterprise environment
in which users lock their screen whenever leaving their
desks. In this context, the trade-offs appear reasonable
if newly-enrolled users can learn a strong password after
two weeks of reduced security (to the level of a user-
chosen password) with about 10 minutes of aggregate
time spent learning during the training period.
In contexts with far fewer logins, such as password
managers or private keys which might be used once
per day or less, learning might require a larger number
of total logins. If a higher total number of logins are
needed and they occur at a slower rate, this may lead
to an unacceptable period of reduced security. In this
case, security-conscious users could use rehearsals out-
side of authentication events. Further, if codes are used
extremely infrequently after being memorized, artiﬁcial
rehearsalsmaybedesirableevenafterlearningthesecret.
These are important cases to study, in particular as these
are cases in which there is no good alternative defense
against ofﬂine brute-force attacks.
While the learning rates of our participants did not
slow down as the number of chunks they memorized in-
creased, they might have more have trouble as the num-
ber of chunks grows further or as they have to asso-
ciatedifferentcodeswithdifferentaccounts. Fortunately,
most users only have a small number of accounts valu-
able enough to require a strong random secret.
9 Conclusion
For those discouraged by the ample literature detailing
the problems that can result when users and security
mechanisms collide, we see hope for the human race.
Most users can memorize strong cryptographic secrets
when, using systems freed from the constraints of tradi-
tional one-time enrollment interfaces, they have the op-
portunity to learn over time. Our prototype system and
evaluation demonstrate the brain’s remarkable ability to
learn and later recall random strings—a fact that sur-
prised even participants at the conclusion of our study.
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